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Abstract 3 
Sustainable investing includes the application of non-financial (Environmental, Social and 4 
Governance (ESG)) criteria to asset selection in institutional investor portfolios (Capelle-5 
Blancard and Mojon 2011).  The article explores the implications for applying ESG screening 6 
to the institutional investors making the asset selections.  Institutional investors are a 7 
heterogeneous group of investors, with fund managers specifically being some of the largest 8 
listed organisations globally (Ingley and van der Walt 2004).  Whether their own corporate 9 
management duties to fiduciary governance (the G in ESG) benefiting their shareholders has 10 
any material impact on the financial returns outcomes of the pension asset management 11 
contract, and specifically whether there is a fiduciary conflict favouring of the exclusive best 12 
interest of fund management shareholders is the question addressed by the paper. 13 
Key words:  UK pensions, fund managers, sustainable investing, ESG, corporate governance, 14 
fiduciary duties, Principal-Agent theory  15 
UK pension sustainability and fund manager governance:  Agent duties to 16 
the principal 17 
Sustainable investing includes the application of non-financial (Environmental, Social and 18 
Governance (ESG)) criteria to asset selection in institutional investor portfolios (Capelle-19 
Blancard and Mojon 2011).  The article explores the implications for applying ESG screening 20 
to the institutional investors making the asset selections.  Moving away from the moral ESG 21 
screening of ethical or impact investing, it examines these non-financial risks (and 22 
opportunities) for the potential of becoming financial risks, thereby seeking to protect asset 23 
owners against future valuation shocks (Freshfields 2005).  In 2014 the UK recorded £5 24 
trillion in assets under management in the financial services industry, with the accumulated 25 
pension assets accounting for 38% of the industry total (Meade 2014).  This is a significant 26 
industry of social savings, systemically critical to the stock market and economy, and the 27 
security of the participating workforce (Monks 2002).  In order to protect the investment of 28 
these contributions, pension trusts have been handed legislated and court appointed fiduciary 29 
duties (Richardson 2011).  Adolf Berle and Gardener Means (1932) described the essence of 30 
these duties: 31 
Taking this doctrine back into the womb of equity, whence it sprang, the foundation becomes 32 
plain. Wherever one man or a group of men entrusted another man or group with the 33 
management of property, the second group became fiduciaries. As such they were obliged to 34 
act conscionably, which meant in fidelity to the interests of the persons whose wealth they 35 
had undertaken to handle. (Berle and Means 1932, p.336 cited Boatright 1994, p.394). 36 
This obligation demands pension trusts undertake to invest member contributions with 37 
attention, expertise and care (Pacces 2000).  In order to fulfil the duty the majority outsource 38 
their assets to financial experts, the corporate intermediaries of the finance sector.  These 39 
contractual relationships exhibit typical principal-agent characteristics, where the principal 40 
lacks the expertise to carry out a task and enlists an agent with relevant expertise to act on 41 
their behalf (Eisenhardt 1989).  The law of agency confers strong commitments on the agent 42 
to protect the principal, and specifically to avoid using their advantageous position to the 43 
principal’s detriment (Lan and Hercleous 2010).   44 
Yet the fiduciary duty Berle and Means were describing was that of corporate management to 45 
external shareholders.  Institutional investors are a heterogeneous group of investors, with 46 
fund managers specifically being some of the largest listed organisations globally (Ingley and 47 
van der Walt 2004).  Whether their own corporate management duties to their shareholders 48 
has any material impact on the financial returns outcomes of the pension agency contract, and 49 
specifically whether there is a fiduciary conflict favouring of the exclusive best interest of 50 
fund management shareholders is the question addressed by the paper. 51 
Conflicted fiduciary recipients of funds management 52 
The literature informs us that corporate governance is important to the stable and appropriate 53 
performance of corporate entities (Hutchison 2011; Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010; Aglietta 54 
and Reberioux 2005).  Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as the system of 55 
laws, rules, and factors that control corporate operations.  Its purpose is to control the 56 
classical economic agency problem Jensen and Meckling (1976) described as the separation 57 
of those who provide the money from those who control it. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 58 
describe it as the way in which suppliers of finance assure themselves a return on their 59 
investment.  LaPorta et al. (2000) broaden participation to both shareholders and creditors, 60 
protected from expropriation by the law.  The pension principal is equally a supplier of 61 
finance to the fund manager, whose corporate purpose is to maximise the return on 62 
investment on pension client assets.  Triantis and Daniels (1995) remind us that in the 63 
banking industry shareholder supplies of finance are mostly outweighed by depositor 64 
contributions.  As far back as 1976 Robert Charles Clark described depositor protection in the 65 
retail banking industry as establishing the trust and confidence required to attract depositor 66 
finance, given that deposit financing dwarfs equity financing on the balance sheet.  Clark 67 
(1976, p.6) described a bank's shareholders as "elite suppliers of capital" typically less 68 
numerous, wealthier, and suppliers of a smaller and static proportion of the funds used by 69 
banks.  These same observations could be made of the finance corporations that manage 70 
pension funds, yet they seem conspicuously absent from scrutiny (Bogle 2009).  Figure 1 71 
speculates on a principal-agent tipping point, where the principal of chief fiduciary duty to 72 
the fund manager converts along the organisational spectrum from the pension client to the 73 
external shareholder. This suggests the possibility that the corporate governance of fund 74 
managers may be detrimental to the pension trust where the fund manager is maximising 75 
shareholder wealth. 76 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 77 
The literature concentrates on empirical correlations between all aspects of corporate 78 
governance and financial performance (Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf 2011; Khan 2006; 79 
for a meta-analysis see Orlitzky et al. 2003).  It also analyses fund management financial 80 
performance, particularly the search for a relationship between sustainable investment and 81 
fund manager outperformance (for literature reviews, see Capelle-Blancard and Mojon 2011; 82 
Hoepner 2007).  What the paper addresses is how the conflicted governance of publicly listed 83 
agents tasked with sustainable wealth production for both shareholders and pension clients 84 
may affect the pension principals’ net performance after fees and charges.  85 
Critiquing fund manager performance:  Using finance theory, needing 86 
agency theory 87 
In the behavioural analysis of capital channelling, Franklin Allen (2001, p.1165) asks “do 88 
financial institutions matter?” Financial intermediation theory assumes investors enter the 89 
market directly, incurring market-induced transaction costs for channelling pooled savings 90 
through the banking industry as borrowing and lending, or through the stock and 91 
commodities markets as investment in assets (Levine 2002). The finance industry is 92 
theoretically an agora for buyers and sellers to come together.  Allen (2001, p.1166) argues 93 
“how can it be that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency 94 
problem, but when you give it to a firm there is?” The narrow focus of corporate governance 95 
theory remains on the real economy, and financial intermediation theory exists in the oddly 96 
assumed institution-free finance industry, so that these phenomena need not be analysed in 97 
unison (Bogle 2009).  In reality investors are dependent on financial institutions for 98 
information and transactions execution, dependent on their fiduciary obligations of 99 
disclosure, honesty and promise keeping (Dunfee & Gunter 1999).  These are the functional 100 
outcomes of the corporate governance mechanism for shareholders, not clients. 101 
The appropriate unit of measurement for analysis of the effect the agent has over the pension 102 
principal is the net outcome of the investment performance achieved by the fund manager 103 
after all fees and charges.  The agent should protect this principal and specifically avoid using 104 
their advantageous position to the detriment of their in-hand returns (Lan and Heracleous 105 
2010).  Economic agency theory hypothesises that the pension trust will incentivise the fund 106 
manager to the extent that it is in the efficient best interest of the agent to deliver this (Jensen 107 
and Meckling 1976).  Pension trusts are compelled by law to act for contributing 108 
beneficiaries for the “exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them and defraying 109 
administrative expenses” (Greenwood 1996; see Cowan v. Scargill for the landmark case law 110 
on duties).  To discharge the latter duty, pension funds must ensure that the fund managers’ 111 
fee for handling their assets represents a fair price for members (Kay 2012).   112 
Depending where the fund manager sits on the governance spectrum, they are presented with 113 
a conflict of interest that pits their fiduciary duties to shareholders against their agency duties 114 
to a client vulnerable to information asymmetry.  The Law Commission Review (2013, p.21) 115 
interpreted the fiduciary standard owed by the fund manager as “ensuring that the direct and 116 
indirect costs of services provided are reasonable and disclosed, and that conflicts of interest 117 
are avoided wherever possible, or else disclosed or otherwise managed to the satisfaction of 118 
the client or beneficiary.”  Conversely, in its consultation with pension trustees, it found that 119 
“many trustees were aware of their status as fiduciaries, which resonates with a sense of 120 
altruism.  Trustees contrasted their special status as fiduciaries with the focus of others in the 121 
investment chain on making money” (Law Commission Review 2013, p.7).  This sentiment is 122 
endorsed by the Nicholls and Brown (2013) survey into investment management fees, 123 
concluding that disclosure may be an issue for pension trusts “particularly as the[se] fees are 124 
high in relation to the returns achieved”.  In contrast the Investment Management Association 125 
asserted fund managers’ rights to pressure pension trusts into non-disclosure agreements 126 
regarding fees; a development David Blake of The Pensions Institute describes as “an 127 
outrage” (Sharman 2014). 128 
Many pension mandates now require non-financial performance (ESG) screening of their 129 
portfolios for various ethical and financial outperformance motivations deemed beneficial to 130 
their membership base, and many fund managers differentiate themselves in the market with 131 
this capability (Kay 2012).  The sustainable investment literature continues the search to link 132 
ESG excellence to financial outperformance (Hoepner and McMillan 2009).  If there is a link 133 
between ESG excellence and the financial outperformance of a listed entity, it should 134 
consistently apply to a listed fund manager.  Fund manager absolute risk-adjusted return on 135 
investment outperformance of an agreed benchmark is analysis of financial performance 136 
alone.  Agency characteristics include justifiable fees for performance towards the pension 137 
principal.  However the theory would hold that ESG excellence in the fund manager is 138 
governance excellence favouring returns to the shareholders as their asset owners.   These 139 
returns come from the fees for handling client assets (Kay 2012).  It should be incumbent on 140 
pension trusts to consider the non-financial performance of fund managers in the discharge of 141 
their fiduciary duties to the trust members, and an important consideration in the pension 142 
trust’s fund management selection framework.   143 
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